Proctor v. State- (Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, 1918) [Back to Buisness]

Shortly following the Emperor's initiation of Order 66, the secondary market for Jedi lightsabers exploded, with hundreds filling the black markets on Coruscant. While the statutory language of Order 66 largely dealt with the removal of Jedi commanders, §A(3) made it illegal for any citizen of the Empire to possess Jedi paraphernalia with the intention of practicing the Jedi arts, including the use of lightsabers; punishable by death by means of firing squad, force choke or lightning. Mere ownership of lightsabers exclusively, however, was not illegal.

Marso Yula was a low level bureaucrat and Imperial officer on Coruscant who secretly collected lightsabers purchased from bounty hunters, stormtroopers, and the black markets. Yula wished to learn the ways of the Jedi, but had never acted upon these intentions. While following a tip in efforts to obtain the light saber of fabled Jedi Qui-Gon Jinn, Yula was arrested by a stormtrooper raid and later charged under violation of Order 66, §A(3).

However, upon review by the Coruscant division of the Imperial Court of Appeals Order 66 §A(3) was termed "inoperative and void." The court held that since ownership of lightsabers was entirely legal, the fact that Yula had an illegal intent to learn the Jedi arts was immaterial. Under the Imperial Penal Code, charging an individual with a crime required BOTH a physical act (Actus Reus) and an intent to act illegally (Mens Rea). While Yula may have (and in fact, did) intended to act illegally by learning the ways of the Jedi, the unfilled action meant a lack of "Actus Reus", and thus Yula could not be charged with a crime. Order 66 §A(3) was then struck down for its problematic requirements, and Yula was released, but was compelled to "donate" her collection to Darth Vader via a most persuasive force gripping.